



Investment Plans as Forecasts
The opening season of each new year sees an
overwhelming number of economic forecasts.
These economic forecasts differ not only by the
individuals or institutions making them but also
by the methodologies used. Some forecasts are
primarily judgemental, others are based mainly
on survey information, and still others employ
econometric modeling techniques.
Important examples ofthe use of survey infor-
mation in forecasting are the surveys of planned
capital spending by business compiled by both
the Commerce Department's Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA) and the McGraw-Hili Pub-
lishing Company. The fall surveys recently
released by BEA and McGraw-Hili indicate an
increase of 0.2 percent and a decline of 3.1 per-
cent, respectively, in real capital spending (nom-
inal spending adjusted for anticipated changes
in the prices of capital goods) from 1986 to
1987. Weak capital spending, in turn, is a key
element in the moderate economic growth that
most forecasters picture for 1987.
But just how useful is such survey information
on capital spending compared to other available
forecasts? This Letter examines whether the BEA
and McGraw-Hili surveys provide very much
useful information by comparing their forecasts
with those from a standard econometric model.
Surveys vs. an econometric model
The BEA takes surveys of capital spending plans
four times ayear, while McGraw-Hili conducts
its surveys every spring and fall. We will focus
on the fall surveys, which give the outlook for a
fu II year ahead. Respondents are asked how
much their companies will spend on plant and
equipment in the year ahead and also how
much they expect the prices they pay for plant
and equipment to rise. (Recently, BEA sub-
stituted an extrapolation of price increases in the
previous year for the answer to the latter ques-
tion.) By subtracting the expected percentage
change in prices from the anticipated percentage
increase in nominal spending, the surveys arrive
at the percentage increase in real (or adjusted for
prices) spending anticipated by the respondents.
Economic forecasters are generally most inter-
ested in the outlook for nonresidential fixed
investment as measured by the national income
accounts, which is not quite the same concept
as the spending on plant and equipment used in
the surveys. For example, investment in the farm
sector is included in nonresidential fixed invest-
ment but not in the plant and equipment series.
Also, the nonresidential fixed investment series
reflects the value of new construction put in
place and shipments of equipment whereas the
plant and equipment series reflects expenditures,
which on balance tend to come later. Neverthe-
less, the value of nonresidential fixed investment
is within 2 percent oftotal plant and equipment
expenditures, and the two generally tend to
move quite closely together.
The econometric model that we use to forecast
nonresidential fixed investment follows the neo-
classical approach elaborated by Professors
Robert Hall and Dale Jorgenson. In neoclassical
theory, capital is viewed as a substitute for other
factors of production. Firms in neoclassical the-
ory therefore respond to the relative prices of
capital goods (their prices relative to that of
other factors of production) in making their deci-
sions to invest in plant and equipment. The rela-
tive prices of capital goods, in turn, depend
importantly upon real (or inflation-adjusted)
interest rates, taxes, and physical rates of
depreciation. The higher the relative prices of
capital goods, the lower will be the amount of
capital per unit of output that firms will desire to
hold, and the greater will be the amount of other
factors, such as labor, that they will wish to
employ.
Firms adjust to the difference between their
desired and actual capital stocks gradually. As a
result, the amount of new planned investment,FRBSF
equal to the amount of capital appropriations, is
some fraction of the difference between the
desired and actual capital stock plus the amount
of investment for replacing existing stock. Actual
spending or gross investment then occurs as a
lagged amount of planned investment dis-
tributed over time. Empirically, there is about a
two-quarter lag between the investment decision
and appropriations, followed by a 7-quarter dis-
tributed lag between appropriations and
expenditures.
Investment plans for the years 1967 through
1985, as indicated by the fall surveys conducted
by BEA and McGraw-Hili, were compared with
forecasts ofnonresidential fixed investment gen-
erated by this standard econometric model.
Forecasts with the econometric model were
made outside the data sample used to estimate
the model, with the estimate being updated each
year. However, the forecasts were based on
actually realized data for final sales, taxes, and
interest rates within the year being forecast.
Thus, they assume more information than would
be available with certainty at the time of a
forecast.
In actuality, not very much more information
was assumed because of the long lags in the
investment process. The assumptions with
respect to the values of the above variables
within the forecasting period actually made very
little difference. Only 20 percent ofthe change
in nonresidential investment was determined by
the values of final sales, taxes, and real interest
rates within the year being forecast, with the
remaining 80 percent determined by already
available information.
Accuracy of the forecasts
The accuracy of alternative forecasts of the rate
of change in real nonresidential fixed investment
is measured by the root mean squared error of
the forecast, which is calculated simply as the
square root of the average of the squared errors.
For an unbiased forecast (in which the errors
tend to cancel out over time), we can expect
that 70 percent of the time the true value of the
change in nonresidential fixed investment will
fall within an interval around the forecast equal
to plus or minus the root mean squared error,
and 95 percentof the time it wiII fall within an
interval equal to plus or minus twice the root
mean squared error.
As a benchmark of minimum acceptable
accuracy, we use a "naive" forecast of no
change in the percentage rate of expansion in
investment from one year to the next. The naive
forecast has errors that tend to cancel out over
time, as indicated by an average error of only
~0.4 percentagepoints. Butits root mean
squared error is 9.6 percentage points. This
means that the naive forecast of no change in
the rate of expansion of investment is correct
within plus or minus 9.6 percentage points 70
percent of the time, and plus or minus 19.2 per-
centage points 95 percent of the time.
Errors from the naive forecast are so large that
they make the forecast virtually useless, but for-
tunately the errors from alternative forecasts are
much smaller. The errors in forecasts made from
the BEA and McGraw-Hili surveys are very simi-
lar to one another. Although the average error is
slightly positive in both, statistical tests reveal
that it is not large enough in either case to be
significantly different from zero. In other words,
it is possible that errors from both surveys would
cancel out in a larger sample. Most importantly,
the root mean squared error of a forecast from
either survey is about 3.5 percentage points less
than that for the naive forecast. In addition, sta-
tistical tests reveal that this improvement over
the naive forecast is not simply attributable to
chance.
The BEA and McGraw-Hili surveys therefore
contain useful information on the outlook for
nonresidential fixed investment. Nevertheless,
the size of their forecast errors is still rather high.
The BEA survey predicts the true value of the
growth in nonresidential fixed investment within
plus or minus 6.0 percentage points 70 percent
of the time, and within plus or minus 12.0 per-
centage points 95 percent of the time; forecast
errrors for the McGraw-Hili survey are slightly
larger.
One might conceivably reduce these forecast
errors by combining the two surveys. But we do
not find that any combination of the BEA and
McGraw-Hili surveys does, in fact, reduce the
root mean squared error of the forecast to less
than that using the BEA survey alone. Although
the BEA survey appears to be slightly more accu-
rate, the McGraw-Hili survey contains essen-
tially the same information, so nothing is gained
by combining the two.As it turns out, the forecast errors generated by
the econometric model are considerably lower
than those from these two surveys. The econo-
metric model's forecast errors average to nearly
zero and give a root mean squared error of 3.3
percentage points - about half that for the sur-
veys. Thus, the econometric model forecasts the
actual rate of expansion in real nonresidential
fixed investment within 3.3 percentage points 70
percent of the time, and within 6.6 percentage
points 95 percent of the time.
Moreover, neither the BEA nor the McGraw-Hili
survey, either singly or in combination, can be
used together with the econometric forecast to
produce significantly lower forecast errors. Thus,
in recent years, forecasts from a standard econo-
metric model of business fixed investment have
been characterized by relatively low errors, and
surveys of planned capital spending have not
added any significant amount of information to
those forecasts.
Forecasts for 1987
As mentioned earlier, the BEA survey forecasts a
0.2 percent improvement in real nonresidential
fixed investment in 1987, while the McGraw-
Hill survey indicates a 3.1 percent decline. Our
analysis of the historical forecast errors indicates
that each ofthese surveys contains useful infor-
mation, and that nothing is gained by combining
them. It also indicates, however, that an econo-
metric model can do even better and that the
smallest forecast errors would have been
obtained simply by using an econometric model
alone.
The econometric model gives a forecast of 4.9
percent real growth in nonresidential fixed
investment for 1987 - a more optimistic fore-
cast than that provided by the surveys. This fore-
cast is based upon the growth rate of real GNP
(about 3.0 percent), and hence final sales, and
the path for interest rates (relatively constant)
predicted by the sample of forecasters polled by
the American Statistical Association and the
National Bureau of Economic Research. The
. greatest source ofthe strength in the forecast
comes from the lagged effects of recent declines
in interest rates adjusted for inflation. However,
the forecast is not very sensitive to the exact
assumptions made about the course of interest
rates and GNP during 1987.
Although our analysis suggests that the econo-
metric forecast alone should be relied upon,
there is at least one special factor this year about
which the surveys may contain some useful
information and which may not be captured by
the standard neoclassical model. That factor is
the 50 percent decline in the price of oil that
occurred in 1986. The decline in the price of oil
already appears to have depressed the structures
component of nonresidential fixed investment
substantially through its impact on the expected
profitability of oil drilling, and it is likely to con-
tinue to hold down investment in structures into
1987.
To capture the effect of oil prices on business
fixed investment, we re-estimated the neoclassi-
cal model to include the influence of the real
price of oil on the desired amount of capital in
structures. We find that a fall in the real price of
oil has the expected negative effect on invest"
ment, and significantly so. Moreover, this modi-
fied neoclassical investment equation predicts
only a 2.8 percent rate of growth in real nonresi-
dential fixed investment from 1986 to 1987.
Taking into account the mild tendency of the
surveys of planned investment to underestimate
actual investment, this final econometric fore-
cast is about the same as the BEAsurvey and
somewhat more optimistic than the McGraw-
Hill survey. However, the historical record indi-
cates that the two surveys do not really add any
significant information to that already contained
in the econometric forecast. The most reliable
forecast is the econometric one, and there is no
evidence to suggest that forecast errors can be
reduced any further by combining it with the
others.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 206,791 56 4,310 2.1
Loans and Leases1 6 186,011 - 15 3,134 1.7
Commercial and Industrial 54,930 - 53 1,964 3.7
Real estate 67,028 - 65 1,237 1.8
Loans to Individuals 38,811 - 250 - 1,538 - 3.8
Leases 5,472 - 95 - 243 - 4.2
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 13,635 69 2,605 23.6
OtherSecurities2 7,146 3 - 1,429 - 16.6
Total Deposits 209,502 - 195 6,812 3.3
Demand Deposits 54,263 - 509 5,216 10.6
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 35,327 - 3,064 - 9,735 - 21.6
OtherTransaction Balances4 19,317 - 483 4,322 28.8
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 135,922 798 - 2,727 - 1.9
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 47,270 621 1,491 3.2
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 32,521 253 - 6,227 - 16.0
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 28,503 508 268 0.9
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)jDeficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes u.s. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change